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Book Review
Moral Repair. Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing. Margaret Urban Walker. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, xii + 250 pages (includes bibliography and index), hardback.
Margret Urban Walker's book is, in the author's own words, "an examination of an unavoidable human
task: moral repair" (6) and at the same time a contribution to timely themes of the moral emotions and
attitudes involved in sustaining or reconstructing moral bonds: hope, trust, resentment, forgiveness and
reparation. The main claims of the book are unfolding throughout the chapters, through many illustrations
and discussions of individual examples, rather than being stated and then systematically argued for. This
involves much repetition, the aim of which is to refine the arguments and avoid, to the highest possible
extent, the loss or simplification of the variety of human experience related to harm and reparation.
People respond to wrong doing with a variety of attitudes, ranging from insisting on a tooth for
tooth revenge to rejecting revenge, offering unconditional forgiveness and even accusing the
revenging victims that they are turning into victimizers themselves. Walker's main interest is to
think which of the actual responses to wrongdoing are adequate in achieving moral repair. Moral
repair itself is understood as a process through which people restore – or, in some cases, create
afresh – the conditions necessary to sustain moral relationships. The general task of the book is to
give a rich account of precisely these conditions, which are the often unacknowledged background
against which we can sustain moral relationships. The six chapters of the book are dedicated either
to a general discussion of the moral repair (the first chapter), or to each of the elements it involves
(mentioned above.)
As a consequence of wrongdoing people suffer many harms, one of which is the damage done to
their ability to relate to each other as moral beings. What are the most successful ways of
addressing this particular harm? One of the central theses of the book, and a point which its author
repeats and emphasises in various contexts throughout the chapters, is the importance of having
one's story of suffering wrongs heard, publicly acknowledged and, as a consequence, having the
responsible people held accountable for what they did. If possible, seeing signs of repentance in
these people is particularly healing and conductive to renewed moral connections. The actual
infliction of adequate punishment on the perpetrators of wrongs seems to be of secondary
importance to victims, once their story receives public recognition.
A particular strength of Walker's book, which makes it both interesting and original, is that she is
constantly placing the discussion of moral reparation and its necessary components into the broader
social context. Instead of focussing exclusively, or mainly, on the relationship between wrongdoer
and victim, she is always paying special attention to the ways in which moral relationships between
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individuals are socially embedded. This is particularly helpful, in more than one way: it allows us
to make sense of many of the victims' moral emotions – for example people's sense that a lack of
recognition of the wrongs they have suffered can be as harming as the wrongs themselves and most
victims insistence on the public nature of all adequate reparation. Additionally, it helps readers see
the many connections between the failure to repair moral relationships and different ways of
(perpetuating) harms and injustices and it even draws readers' attention to so-far unanalyzed forms
of injustice. Thus, for instance, Walker succeeds in showing why hope and trust, as essential
components of moral relationships, are also socially produced goods whose distribution is a matter
of justice; systematically undermining, or failing to restore them, therefore, can have implications
for justice (more on this issue latter.) An upshot of the argument is that communities should be held
responsible to the sufferers of injustice and wrongdoings and should take an active role in moral
repair, as opposed to privatizing these issues – by portraying them as matters to be taken care of by
isolated individuals themselves – or letting time alone heal the wounds. An interesting conceptual
claim made by Walker, but only sketched in her book, is that a community is jeopardizing its very
identity when it fails to achieve moral repair by upholding its moral standards and behaving
responsibly towards its victims.
In the first chapter Walker outlines the various tasks of the book, explains the importance of
communities achieving moral repair and emphases the importance of having one's voice as a victim
heard – and one's story acknowledged. At the centre of the argument is an understanding of moral
identities as having a strong narrative element: to make sense – including moral sense – of their
lives, and repair the “moral fractures” that result from wrongdoing, people need to be able to share
with others their histories of being betrayed, exploited, terrorised or otherwise harmed. Being heard
is thus an essential part of the process of remaining in the moral community and necessary if
victims are to avoid self-blame and to recover self-respect. Being heard gives victims what Walker
calls “normative confirmation,” which is the symbolic expression of their community's commitment
to protect and, to the extent to which it is possible, heal their victims. Repair is future-oriented, but
in order to be effective it has to incorporate victims' own accounts of their past suffering. Moral
repair is defined as “restoring or creating trust and hope in a shared sense of value and
responsibility” and, according to Walker, it should accomplish six tasks: attribute responsibility
correctly, acknowledge the harm to both victims and communities, recover the community's moral
standards (when they have been shattered by the wrongdoing), recreate the trust in these standards,
nurture hope in the trustworthiness of those who have to sustain the moral standards, and reconnect
victims and perpetrators in moral relationships (when possible). (28) Here, as everywhere
throughout the book, Walker prefers to outline the factors that contribute to, or favour, a particular
moral process, rather than lay out necessary and sufficient conditions. Therefore, processes that do
not fulfil all the above criteria may still qualify as successful instances of moral repair.
The second chapter, on hope, proceeds by outlining the value of hope as both an individual and a
social necessity, its absence being thus conductive to both individual and social harms. Hopefulness
in individuals or social groups has empowering effects: it promotes agency by sustaining motivation
and the ability to stand losses, by giving structure to people's life plans and by helping them to cope
with difficult circumstances. Conversely, hopelessness disempowers and undermines agency, which
in turn may lead to the perpetuation of injustices, when people are not able enough to resist them.
Since moral repair requires the recreation of trust, and trust itself requires that people are hopeful
enough to take action towards creating links of trust, then moral repair requires (re)establishing
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hope. Walker is careful not to overlook the dangers of hope (of placing it wrongly and wasting
one's efforts) and for this reason she is clearly – perhaps too clearly – distinguishing it from
different forms of wishful thinking. Thus, destroying hope – which is one of the moral
consequences of wrongdoing that needs to be addressed in the process of moral repair – attacks the
very moral texture of a community. Hope is a social good, of which some people are deprived; this
constitutes a form of injustice. The chapter concludes by stating an obligation of moral communities
to “nurture, protect, and restore the hopes on which human beings and moral relations depend.” (71)
Trust and the consequences of damaging it are the objects of the third chapter. Walker examines
both the virtues of trust as the necessary glue of social relationships and the vulnerability to which
trustfulness exposes us. Like in the cases of all other conceptual analysis offered in this book, its
author rejects the possibility of capturing, in a single definition, what trust is. Her analysis of trust
builds on the insights of previous authors such as Annette Baier and Trudy Govier; Walker offers
her own generic approach to interpersonal trust: “a kind of reliance on others whom we expect
(perhaps only implicitly or unreflectively) to behave as relied upon (e.g. in specified ways, in ways
that fulfil an assumed standard, or in ways so as to achieve relied-upon outcomes) and to behave
that way in the awareness (if only implicit or unreflective) that they are liable to be held responsible
for failing to do so or to make reasonable efforts to do so” (80). Thus her analysis is mainly
concerned with the trust in the sense of “trusting somebody” (a two-place structure trust) rather than
in the sense explored by alternative literature on trust, that of “trusting somebody to do something”
(as three-place structure trust) – the second an arguably less demanding conception of trust. The
most original and intriguing element of Walker’s analysis here is the argument that default trust is
unequally distributed within societies; groups of people who suffer from unrepaired harms such as
historical or systematic discrimination or oppression also tend to enjoy less default trust on account
of their sex, race, religion, sexual identity, cast and so on. This in turn entails an additional forms of
injustice, since trust itself is a form of capital. Another contribution Walker makes to the literature
on trust is her ability to explain why the value of trust is not only instrumental (as a necessary
component for all social relations) but also intrinsically moral. She argues that an ability to trust is
essential for our capacity to be in control of ourselves and our lives – in other words, for our sense
of agency. Like in the case of hope, undermining trust is itself a moral wrong which needs
reparation and this is an essential step in the process of moral repair. And as in the case of all stages
of moral repair, the failure of a community to publicly recognise the entire extent of the wrong
suffered by victims is a further attack on everybody's trust in shared moral standards.
The next chapter, on resentment, follows the philosophical tradition of understanding resentment as
a natural and valuable reaction to wrongdoing, expressing allegiance to shared standards and a sense
that one's security has been threatened. At the same time, however, it can signal moral divisions
inside a community and give those who fell outside a community a common ground to form new
alliances. Walker suggests a broader concept of resentment than usually employed in literature, not
to be limited to a response to actual moral injury but rather to be understood as a response to
perceived injury of oneself or another, whether or not such injury be morally objectionable or not.
This wide understanding leaves more room for objecting to certain instances of resentment. The
valuable function of resentment, according to Walker, is that it indicates an asymmetry in people's
power to define and enforce shared norms, and the morally adequate attitude is to acknowledge and
answer resentment – even exacerbated resentment (instead of simply ignoring it).
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In the fifth chapter Walker rejects an essentialist approach to forgiveness, thus avoiding to
exclusively define it through a feature or set of features that are necessary and sufficient for any
instance of forgiveness. The most widely used definitions of forgiveness in literature, which include
overcoming of resentment, releasing of the wrong-doer from debt, restoring a relationship, and
seeing a wrong as resting entirely in the past are all, according to Walker, important facets of
forgiveness. But, she argues, since there is no single process that (best) deserves to be called
"forgiveness", none of these features is either necessary or sufficient. By contrast, there are several
kinds of forgiveness which vary throughout cultures and different human practices. The chapter
offers a rich discussion of three of these facets of forgiveness: overcoming resentment, restoring
relationships and fixing wrongs in the past.
Walker's own original contribution to the understanding of forgiveness is seeing it as a process of
restructuring, of moral reconstruction. Discussing forgiveness in the context of relationships is
particularly important to her account, because forgiveness is effective as a form of reparation when
it contributes to reviving trust and promoting shared moral understandings. Sometimes this goes
hand in hand with restoring the relationship between victim and offender, and between the offender
and the community. Other times, however, when the offender or the victim has died, when the
wrongdoing is unforgivable, or when forgiveness is not possible precisely because the victim
knows she or he will not have to deal with the offender again, forgiveness cannot reconnect the
offender and the victim. In such cases, as in others, forgiveness plays the role of (re)establishing
trust and hope in shared understandings and norms. As when analyzing other instances of moral
repair, Walker insists on the importance of public acknowledgement of wrongdoing and getting the
relevant community involved as part of the background which gives meaning and endurance to
moral relationships.
The last chapter looks at making amends; minimally, they should consist in one accepting
responsibility for the wrongdoing one has done. In line with the aim of her book, Walker's argument
for restorative justice prioritizes the importance of bringing about moral repair, of “reweaving a
moral fabric” – rather than seeing amends as aimed at doing justice with moral repair as a collateral
consequence.
Throughout her book, Walker uses a variety of sources - fiction, philosophical literature as well as
recent history - in order to illustrate her points and help the reader reflect on their relevance. Even
more excitingly, I found her reliance on both fictional and empirical cases inspiring in getting me to
think further, and in new ways, about issues connected to moral harm and moral repair. By writing
this book, Walker has attempted to give full acknowledgement to the wide diversity of human
experience, to the entire range of our emotional and moral responses to wrongdoing. At the level of
style this translates into a liberal use of adjectives and concepts, as the author is more interested in
capturing nuances and the relationships between various ideas and concepts than in outlining easily
accessible arguments. The same characteristics which ensure the richness of the analysis make for a
slow and difficult reading, that is however fully rewarding in the end.
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Universite Catolique de Lille
